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INTRODUCTION 
The Plaintiffs argue in then principal brief that §38-9-1, the wrongful lien 
statute should be applied to a notice of interest filed pursuant to § 57-9-4 Utah Code 
Annotated. 
The Plaintiffs argument is twofold. First, even though §57-9-4 authorizes a 
notice of interest may, the notice may be summarily dissolved pursuant to the provisions of 
§38-9-1 et seq. (wrongful lien statute). Second, the defendants, in any event, were not 
entitled to file a notice of interest pursuant to §57-9-4 of the Utah Code Annotated. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
§38-9-1 et seq. is a summary process which, on its face, is not applicable 
to Notices of Interest filed pursuant to §57-9-4, Utah Code Annotated. 
The argument that the wrongful lien statute (§38-9-1, et seq.) applies to 
notices of interest filed under a separate statute requires a giant circular leap of judgment. 
§38-9-1 (6) (a) provides as follows: 
"Wrongful lien" means any document that purports to create a 
lien or encumbrance on an owner's interest in certain real 
property and at the time it is recorded or filed is not 
(a) expressly authorized by this chapter or another 
state or federal statute. 
A notice of interest is expressly authorized by a state statute (§57-9-4). On the face of the 
statute then the wrongful lien statute cannot apply to any notice of interest filed pursuant to 
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§57-9-4. Plaintiffs argument that a Court is entitled to determine whether or not a notice 
of interest is valid under the wrongful lien statute is without merit and, in any event, not 
previously asserted by the plaintiff below. 
The case is one of first impression - as to the applicability of the wrongful lien statute 
to a notice of interest The essence of the plaintiffs argument and the Court's decision is, and 
always has been, that plaintiff could file a lis pendens to protect its interest and therefore, 
notice of interest could not be filed. Because the wrongful lien statute is a summary process, 
it clearly was not designed to apply a notice of interest specifically authorized by the 
legislature. 
II. 
Defendant is entitled to a Notice of Interest on the property in question. 
The Court below cannot use the summary process designed by §38-9-1 etseq. 
to determine the validity of a notice of interest. Even if such an analysis was permitted by 
the statute defendant's notice of interest is proper. 
The essence of plaintiffs argument that defendant was not entitled to a notice 
of interest is that defendant had a bare contract right and not an interest in land, which 
plaintiff argues is required to file a notice of interest The defendant was granted by the 
plaintiffs a right to a trust deed, which the plaintiff failed to provide. Therefore, the 
defendant's remedy was to file a notice of interest that defendant is entitled to a trust deed 
pursuant to the parties' agreement. Whether or not the defendant' s right to a trust deed arises 
to an interest in land has already been decided by the Court below when it concluded that 
-2-
the defendant's interest was an interest in land, based upon its findings that defendants could 
have filed a lis pendens to protect their interest. A lis pendens represents a notice to the 
world that a person or entity claims an interest in land. §78-40-2 provides as follows: * 
"In any action affecting the title to, or the right of possession of, 
real property the plaintiff at the time of filing the complaint or 
thereafter, and the defendant at the time of filing his answer 
when affirmative relief is claims in such answer, or at any time 
afterward, may file for record with the recorder of the county in 
which the property or some part thereof is situated a notice of 
the pendency of the action, containing the names of the parties, 
the object of the action or defense, and a description of the 
property in that county affected thereby. From the time of filing 
such notice for record only shall a purchase or encumbrancer of 
the property affected thereby be deemed to have constructive 
notice of the pendency of the action . . . " 
Clearly the Court's finding of fact that defendant's remedy was to file an action 
and a lis pendens is controlling as to the facts on appeal. 
III. 
The notice of interest statute (§57-9-4) in plain language permits the filing of a notice 
when a person claims an interest in land. The purpose for the creation of the notice of 
interest statute is for those situations (such as that before the Court) where a person or entity 
claims an interest in land, but does not have a recordable document. On its face, the 
wrongful lien statute excludes from its summary adjudication provisions the notice of 
interest filed by the defendants. 
The Court cannot use the summary process to invalidate properly recorded notice of 
interest. 
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The logical extension plaintiffs argument would permit the wrongful lien statute to 
apply to a mechanic's lien and have it summarily dismissed which, on its face, the statute did 
not intend to do. 
The statute on its face is to provide a summary disposition of those wrongful liens 
which otherwise are not authorized by statutes. Where a statute authorizes the recordation 
as does §57-9-4, there is a mechanism for the orderly disposition, such as mechanics liens, 
and notices of interest. 
There are no Utah cases which provide direction for the Court in this area of the law. 
It has long been held in other jurisdictions, that an executory contract, the effect of which 
is to convey or transfer an equitable title, is a conveyance or transfer within recording laws. 
Keese v. Bardlev. 190 Cat. 213 P. 500. 
The plaintiffs remedy to deal with the notice of interest is to either or both file an 
action for quite title or slander of title. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above the Courts decision below should be reversed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of November, 1999. 
BLACK, STIIH^ARGYLE, P.C. 
David O. Black, AttomeyToTDefendmrts—-—__ 
and Appellants 
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